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Book Notes
HIDING FROM HUMANITEY DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW, BY
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM. PRINCETON: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 2004. Pp. xv + 349. USD $29.95 hardcover.
BY NAOMI HORROX
In Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum considers the roles
that disgust and shame play and ought to play in our personal and social
lives, as well as in the formulation and administration of the law. Nussbaum
suggests that some emotions, such as anger and compassion, serve
important functions in the liberal state; they are intelligent responses that
are attuned both to events in the world and to the person's values and
goals. Shame and disgust are different: they are especially likely to be
normatively distorted and are thus unreliable as guides to public practice.
Disgust, Nussbaum contends, is typically unreasonable as it
embodies "magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to
purity, immortality, and nonanimality." Although it may be useful from an
evolutionary standpoint as it steers us away from danger and decay, and
may serve a function in nuisance law, disgust has been employed to target
vulnerable groups. It should therefore never be the primary basis for
rendering an act criminal, nor should it play an aggravating or a mitigating
role in criminal law.
Shame can be a valuable moral sentiment in people's personal lives
as in some instances it encourages ethical actions. While it has often also
been viewed as an appropriate vehicle for meting out punishment and
reinforcing societal values, Nussbaum asserts that these uses cannot be
reconciled with equal regard for the dignity of all citizens. Shaming
penalties are inappropriate as they humiliate; they invoke mob justice; they
are unreliable; they cause individuals to become more alienated and
troubled; and they represent a dangerous attempt to impose social control.
Inevitably, Nussbaum concludes, disgust and shame will remain a part of
individuals' personal and social lives. The role these emotions play in the
legal sphere, however, particularly with respect to punishment, must be
limited.
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